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The idea of repatriating national powers from the EU is en vogue. The EU Treaty as amended by 
the Lisbon Treaty gave considerably more weight to the principles of subsidiarity, 
proportionality and national identity. This paper will look into the potential limiting effect of the 
Lisbon Treaty’s emphasis on national identity upon EU legislative competence. Against 
constructive approaches regarding the added value of the national identity provision of Article 4 
(2) TEU, this paper will attempt to unpack the constitutional lack of utility of the principle 
through a critical interpretation of new CJEU case law. We will look at cases before the 
Luxembourg Court where Member States have resorted to national identity as a means of 
derogating from their EU law obligations. It is argued that these cases have only been successful 
in rebranding the old CJEU cases on legitimate interests to a new breed of case law bearing the 
national identity tag. The CJEU seems to have envisaged a form of constitutionalism where 
although Member States enjoy a monopoly over the definition of national identity (the 'what'), 
the power to determine the compatibility of those interests with EU obligations (the 'how') is 
vested in the CJEU. As such, this paper will explore whether this development constitutes a 
cause for celebration vis-à-vis the repatriation of national powers from the EU. 
The National identity Clause in the Treaty and its progeny 
 
The EU is under an obligation to respect the identities of the Member States – political or 
constitutional. The Treaty makes this obligation explicit. A ‘national identity clause’ was first 
inserted in the Treaty of Maastricht. Article F (1) TEU was the first provision to constitutionalise 
such obligation by plainly stressing that ‘the Union shall respect the national identities of its 
Member States’. Article F (1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty was later replaced by Article 6 (3) 
TEU of the Amsterdam Treaty which then gave way to current Article 4 (2) TEU of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The latter provision is a lot more comprehensive compared to its predecessors. Its origins 
lie in Article I-5 of the deceased EU Constitutional Treaty. Article 4 (2) TEU provides: 
 
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as 
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It 
shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national 
security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State. 
 
Not only Article 4 (2) TEU is longer and more descriptive than its predecessors but it is also 
supported by the preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which reinforces that in its 
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action, the EU must respect the national identities of the Member States. What is more, its legal 
geography is remarkable. Respect to national identity is packed in Article 4 TEU alongside the 
principles of conferral and loyalty. Respect to all three principles is therefore fundamental to the 
good functioning of the EU. But respect by whom? The legislature in the exercise of its 
functions? the European Council in its executive capacity or rather the CJEU in the exercise of 
its judicial functions? As a supplementary to the principle of conferral further manifested in 
Article 5 (1) TEU, one would expect that Article 4 (2) TEU is addressed to the EU legislature 
meaning that the Commission, the Council and the Parliament shall not go beyond achieving 
objectives which may impinge on the national identity of the Member States. Yet the wording of 
Article 4 (2) TEU implies that the obligations stemming from it are binding on the EU as a 
whole. This all-encompassing reference implies that all EU Institutions are bound by Article 4 
(2) TEU during the exercise of their duties.1  
 
Accordingly, respect to national identities can be invoked by a Member State as a means of 
placing under review the legality of EU legislative acts in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. In 
this respect Article 4 (2) TEU implies that national identity counterweights the principle of EU 
law primacy. It also keeps any expansionist claims of EU competence at bay. This attribute of 
Article 4 (2) TEU as a cause of action under Article 263 TFEU is particularly beneficial for the 
UK and Dutch governments whose general aversion towards making a federation out of the EU 
is well known. Both governments have recently conducted a balance of competence review to 
explore how much power has the EU acquired since they joined the EU. But despite the British 
or Dutch views about European integration, the fact that, for instance, apart from the principle of 
conferral the Commission needs to be cautious when proposing legislation not to impinge upon 
national identities is a welcome development for any of the twenty-eight Member States. For 
instance, an insistence on identity-scrutiny of EU legislative proposals may motivate national 
parliaments to be more observant in their reading of proposals emanating from the Commission. 
Indeed, post-Lisbon the Protocol on the application of the principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality is more focused on the procedural aspects of the application of Article 5 TEU 
introducing the so-called ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ card procedures which ensure early in the 
legislative process, that the principle of subsidiarity is not violated by the EU Institutions.  
National identity could easily become part and parcel of this new framework for the conduct of 
subsidiarity. One has to be careful however - under the early warning system introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, subsidiarity constitutes a mere political judgment and not in itself a ground for 
judicial review. Therefore, national parliaments, which are primarily concerned with subsidiarity 
or/and national identity violations, are not entitled to bring a direct action against a Council 
measure under Article 263 TFEU. The CJEU would have jurisdiction to consider subsidiarity 
infringements brought by a Member State or notified by them in accordance with their legal 
order on behalf of their national parliament. 
 
We should add here that outside the CJEU, Article 4 (2) TEU provides national courts with the 
opportunity to place EU identity-encroaching acts under close judicial scrutiny at home. In 
theory, national courts can review EU legislation not only when EU Institutions are acting ultra 
vires but also where they are acting intra-vires in tune with the principle of conferral. According 
to the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), which flagged up this idea during its Lisbon 
Urteil, such constitutional check would enable national actors to monitor how the relationship 
between national constitutions and the EU legal system develops after the Member States have 
decided to confer competence to the EU. The BVerfG’s identitätkontrolle implies that European 
integration cannot undermine the fundamentals of the system of majoritarian democratic rule 
that underpin the German Constitution and are recognized in Article 4 (2) TEU in the form of 
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national identities. Hence, EU identity encroaching acts are not only illegal under national law 
but also as a matter of EU law. Any challenge, however, remains a theoretical possibility and as 
the BVerfG’s past ultra vires review identitätkontrolle constitutes a power statement of symbolic 
value. This is because such an insular approach to EU law would result to a subjective and 
integration-proof interpretation of secondary EU legislation by national courts, therefore 
promoting an ‘absolute theory of relativity’. identitätkontrolle is also in principle erratic because 
it contradicts the authority of the CJEU as the supreme court in determining the scope of EU 
law. 
 
Alternatively, Article 4 (2) TEU can be employed by a Member State as a means of derogating 
from its obligations under EU law – claiming that transposing a piece of legislation into national 
law conflicts with legitimate interests or principles which are deeply entrenched in its national 
identity. In this fashion, Article 4 (2) TEU provides Member States with an express EU law 
derogation over the preservation of their national identity. While the use of Article 4 (2) TEU as 
a means of challenging EU legislation constitutes a novelty, this attribute of Article 4 (2) TEU  
(a derogation) does not revolutionise current and future CJEU case law. Still, the CJEU will 
have to ascertain whether the legitimate interest in question forms part of a Member State’s 
national identity. As the present author has argued elsewhere, this attribute of Article 4 (2) TEU 
merely repackages the old free movement case law of the CJEU on legitimate interests.2 Any EU 
lawyer remembers the CJEU’s daring judgments in Schmidberger v. Republic of Austria3 and 
Omega Spiellhallen managing (rather pragmatically) the conflict between fundamental rights 
and fundamental market freedoms.4 Broadly speaking, treating national legitimate interests (e.g. 
the enhanced protection of fundamental rights in the abovementioned cases) as attributes of 
‘national identity’ is not accidental. Such a reading of Article 4 (2) TEU is related to an 
interpretation of national identity as synonymous to constitutional autonomy and national self-
determination, including concerns over the protection of fundamental constitutional norms or, in 
other words, legitimate interests.  
 
The above thoughts aside, the most crucial, perhaps, question that arises when reading Article 4 
(2) TEU is what kind of respect does it generate. In other words, what does national identity 
encompass for the purpose of the Treaty? A pan-European (or to be more precise a pan-EU) 
understanding or definition of identity is important because, as mentioned, similar to conferral 
and loyalty, national identity has become justiciable with the coming into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This is further confirmed by, as we will see later on, recent case law on Article 4 (2) 
TEU. Of course its predecessor in the Treaty of Amsterdam – Article 6 (3) TEU – did not 
exclude the possibility that disrespect to national identity is a sufficient ground for an action for 
annulment. It just seems that Member States did not make any use of it and took it for a 
symbolic reference in the Treaty – a programmatic principle rather than a legal rule. Evidence to 
support this assumption can be drawn from the lack of case law prior to Lisbon on national 
identity as a ground for annulment of EU legislation or as derogation to a Member State’s 
obligations under EU law.  
 
So to return to our question, what does national identity really encompass in EU law? In the 
absence of CJEU case law on former Article 6 (3) TEU, one may only guess that pre-Lisbon this 
reference to national identities merely suggested respect towards the political and cultural 
dimension of national identity. Conversely, the post-Lisbon reference to national identity has 
been enriched with constitutional and legal connotations whilst cultural and linguistic diversity 
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have been tucked away in Article 3 TEU. Hence under the Treaty of Lisbon, respect to national 
identities encompasses respect to national devolution, constitutional structures, and essential 
state functions. These qualities attributed to the wider notion of national identity under Article 4 
(2) TEU have triggered some academic enquiry into the potential use of the concept.5  National 
identity has become ev vogue. Some academics rushed to conclude that the revision of former 
Article 6 (3) TEU by the Treaty of Lisbon underscores ‘the continuing importance and vitality of 
the Member States as sovereign nations whose national identities are manifested in the functions 
and structures of nationhood.’6 Others have claimed in hesitation that the interpretation of 
Article 4 (2) TEU by the CJEU ‘will become the battleground or the meeting point, where the 
limits of the authority of EU law lie.’7   
 
Let us remark here that what really matters is what the CJEU makes of Article 4 (2) TEU, 
meaning how far it will allow admissibility of annulment claims by Member States and how far 
it will go ring-fencing national legitimate interests against the obligations that arise from 
membership to the EU. In other words, national identity is one thing; the obligation of Member 
States under the principle of sincere cooperation or loyalty is another. First of all EU obligations 
under Article 4 (2) TEU to respect national identities are subordinate to the Article 3 TEU 
common values and principles - the components of a workable European identity that Member 
States have willingly adhered to.8 As such, the prospect of fundamental interests which 
defending Member States seek to advance depends upon the classic proportionality test 
employed by the CJEU. So, for instance, cases concerning the balancing of legitimate interests 
with free movement rights will be resolved by reference to the CJEU’s established case law on 
permissible restrictions to free movement balanced through a proportionality assessment and not 
by citation of the abstract notion of ‘respect to national identities’ enshrined in Article 4 (2) TEU 
as a general derogation. Having said that, there is a growing tendency between EU and national 
courts to raise the question of identity and discuss the potential of Article 4 (2) TEU as a side or 
main issue to a case. Still, however, the full potential of the provision is yet to be explored in the 
case law of the CJEU. As things currently stand, the present author is rather pessimistic about 
the added value of the identity clause. He relies on existing case law in order to make his 
observations. 
 
Lessons from the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
 
So far we may agree that constitutionalising national identity in the Treaty is a welcome 
development. But what happens in practice when a case is raised before the CJEU? How willing 
are the judges in Luxembourg to entertain questions about national identity? Although until 
recently the CJEU treaded carefully not to touch upon the Treaty’s identity clause, Advocate 
General Maduro was perhaps the first to remark pre-Lisbon in Spain v Eurojust9 and later in in 
Michaniki10 that the EU’s commitment to national individuality has existed from the outset, 
albeit within defined circumstances. By recalling the CJEU’s established case law he identified 
the intrinsic components of national identity (such as linguistic diversity and transparency and 
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equal treatment between tenderers) now manifest in Article 4 (2) TEU. What is more, Maduro 
provided insight with regard to the type of cases that the national identity clause could be raised. 
In Spain v. Eurojust, Maduro informs us that respect to national identity can be employed by 
Member States as an additional ground for annulment of EU legislation alongside discrimination 
on grounds of nationality whilst in Michaniki as a means of derogating (subject to a rigid 
proportionality assessment) from EU free movement provisions. It is argued here that we have 
witnessed more cases of the latter type like Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein the first post-Lisbon 
judgment on Article 4 (2) TEU. For the sake of refreshing the reader’s memory it is worth 
mentioning that the case involved a challenge against Austrian constitutional law on the 
abolition of titles of nobility irrespective of their origin. The Austrian applicant argued that the 
correction / alteration of her German surname in the Austrian register of civil status equals to 
non-recognition of the effects of her adoption by a German citizen and therefore an obstacle to 
her freedom of movement under Article 21 TFEU. The CJEU held that Article 21 TFEU on EU 
Citizenship must be interpreted as not precluding national authorities in restricted circumstances 
from refusing to recognise all the elements of the surname of a national of that State.11 Equality 
between citizens and the abolition of privilege forms, therefore, part of national identity 
according to Article 4 (2) TEU can be utilized as a justification for prohibiting the acquisition of 
noble titles. 
 
Similarly, in Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn12 regarding rules on identity cards and passports, the 
CJEU established that the Lithuanian language constitutes ‘a constitutional asset which 
preserves the nation’s identity’13 This ‘asset’ is further protected by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the form of respect to cultural and linguistic diversity under Articles 3(3) 
and 22. It therefore arises that a Member States reserves to take measures towards protecting its 
official national language (including rules which govern the spelling of that language). The 
CJEU treats such rules as pursuing a legitimate objective capable of justifying restrictions on the 
rights of freedom of movement and residence as provided in Article 21 TFEU. What is 
interesting here is that Article 4 (2) TFEU is not used in isolation as a public policy derogation 
from the Treaty. It is rather used as complementary justification next to a fundamental right 
enshrined in the Charter. This is an important development because it demonstrates the 
weaknesses of Article 4 (2) TFEU which is restricted by the requirements laid down by EU law 
and must always be proportionate to those objectives.  
 
To sum up, with or without the help of the Charter, Article 4(2) EU includes within its open list 
of identity-related interests abolition of privilege, the protection of a State’s official language 
and respect for linguistic diversity. Both Wittgenstein and Malgožata demonstrate that Article 4 
(2) can be invoked effectively by Member States against Article 21 TFEU in respect of matters 
of civil status (determination of surnames) which fall within their exclusive competence. 
Whether Member States will have the same luck in cases regarding Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of establishment or services where the applicant’s economic activity is at peril (as a 
result of his/her alteration of surname for example) is another question. One shall be reminded of 
Konstantinidis (no relation to the present author), a case decided in favour of the applicant to use 
for professional purposes a spelling of his name which, contrary to national legislation, did not 
expose him to a risk of confusion of identity on the part of his clients.14 What is more, in the 
context of Article 4 (2) TEU, the recent case of Anton Las15 decided in April 2013 shows that a 
Belgian decree adopted pursuant to the Constitution which specified which language (Dutch) 
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shall be used in the workplace in a particular municipality did not survive the challenge against 
the freedom of movement of workers provision of Article 45 TFEU. Likewise, the CJEU 
established that Member States cannot reserve access to the profession of civil-law notary to 
their nationals because the derogation provided for in Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted 
strictly and must be restricted to activities which in themselves are linked with the exercise of 
official authority.16 
 
It arises that although the national identity clause offers a trap door to escape some of the 
obligations that arise under EU law, Member States enjoy little latitude using Article 4 (2) TEU 
as a de facto derogation from these obligations. As already explained, in all cases taking place 
within the scope of EU law, the CJEU will use its established case law on express Treaty 
derogations and legitimate interests (or objective justifications in indirect discrimination cases) 
to restrict the impact of the identity clause through the application of the principles of loyalty 
and proportionality. It is argued that this is in order to ‘bind’ Member States and exert influence 
over their behaviour with regard to their loyalty to European integration. We have already 
started witnessing this trend with respect to the duties of Member States under secondary 
legislation on equal treatment of workers. In O’Brien, the CJEU precluded Member States from 
extending the national identity clause to exempt certain public posts (judges) from the 
application of Directive 97/81 on part-time workers.17 It held that the UK could not maintain a 
distinction between full-time judges and part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid basis, 
unless such a difference in treatment is justified by objective reasons brought in by the national 
court. The CJEU will probably argue similarly in Torresi, a recent preliminary reference from 
Italy on the validity of Article 3 of Directive 98/5 in light of Article 4 (2) TEU.18 The question 
here is whether Member States are allowed to make access to the legal profession (a service 
under EU law) conditional on passing a State examination. The aspect of national identity or 
objective reason in this case – i.e. the safeguarding of consumers of legal services and the proper 
administration of justice is unlikely to succeed the CJEU’s proportionality test.  
 
Let us now turn to the possibility of a Member State utilising Article 4 (2) TEU as a means of 
challenging EU secondary legislation which violates its national identity. Advocate General Bot 
raised this possibility in the recent Melloni case.19 He pointed that: ‘a Member State which 
considers that a provision of secondary law adversely affects its national identity may therefore 
challenge it on the basis of Article 4 (2) TEU.’20 However, he argued ‘we are not faced with 
such a situation in the present case.’21 Melloni was an extradition case regarding an in absentia 
judgment. The CJEU precluded Spain from relying on the indirect violation of the right to fair 
trial under the Spanish Constitution (also enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights) in order to derogate from the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW).22 In other words the CJEU established that the execution of a EAW is not 
conditional upon the conviction rendered in absentia (fraud) being open to appeal in the issuing 
State. The CJEU saved the EAW from yet another constitutional challenge in order to preserve 
the primacy, unity and effet utile of EU law. It held that the EAW was in full compliance with 
the Charter and emphasised that the right to fair trial was not violated because despite the fact 
that the applicant was not present during the trial, he was represented by two lawyers. It also 
stressed that the protection of human rights afforded by EU law cannot go further than the EU 
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law standard. The CJEU therefore dismissed the Solange presumption of equivalence since the 
constitutional provision of Spanish law that afforded citizens a greater standard of protection 
was not taken into account by the judges in Luxembourg. Hence, in the face of it Melloni seems 
to confirm the status quo first established by the CJEU in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft23 
namely that national constitutional norms in conflict with secondary legislation should be 
inapplicable. In reality, however, the judgment goes deeper suggesting that the Charter 
constitutes a maximum standard and not merely a floor of rights upon which Member States can 
build up further and guarantee further protection to their citizens. By contrast to what Besselink 
argues it is highly unlikely that while divergent fundamental rights standards may not be 
resolved explicitly via Article 53 of the Charter (level of protection saving clause) they will be 
resolved by reference to Article 4 (2) TEU.24 It is established practice that when EU secondary 
legislation is reviewed, a blanket EU standard applies. The CJEU will most likely disagree that 
unique fundamental rights standards in the Member States will survive conflict with EU 
legislation if they are presented as part of the constitutional identity of Member States. Had the 
case been different by virtue of the identity clause a retrial of the infamous Viking would have 
given us a different – non-pragmatic – outcome.25 
 
Conclusion: Nothing new under the sun 
 
As it arises from the above analysis the CJEU has been comfortable mentioning national identity 
in its rulings. Most comfortable with the identity clause, however, are the Advocate Generals 
who are trying to give legitimate derogations under EU law an ‘identity’ veneer. In the recent 
ZZ, case regarding exclusion of an EU citizen from the UK on grounds of public security, 
Advocate General Bot remarked that the objective of protecting state security manifested in 
Article 30 (2) of Directive 2004/38 can be linked to Article 4 (2) TEU. Hence national identity 
can be employed by a Member State to give more teeth to an expulsion decision drawn from a 
legitimate derogation available in secondary legislation. In ZZ, the CJEU held in favour of the 
UK stressing that ‘it is clear from Article 4(2) TEU and Article 346(1)(a) TFEU that State 
security remains the responsibility of solely the Member States. The question referred thus 
relates to an area governed by national law and, for that reason, does not fall within European 
Union competence.’ Hence Article 4 (2) TEU serves a means to demarcate national from EU 
competence. Does this realisation alter what would have happened anyway if, for instance, the 
UK had brought the public policy / security argument as an objective justification to justify its 
position? Surely not.  
 
Member States need to be cautious that all future cases employing Article 4 (2) TEU as an EU 
law qualified derogation will still have to operate within the boundaries established by the CJEU 
in its case law over the years. Given how prescriptive the CJEU has been about the EU 
constraints that national legitimate interests have to operate within, there is no much cause for 
celebration vis-à-vis how much constitutional autonomy can Member States afford by invoking 
Article 4 (2) TEU as a legitimate derogation. The CJEU has expressly recognized the aptitude of 
Member States to safeguard the protection of fundamental rights as enshrined in their 
constitutions (such as human dignity and equality), it has entertained the idea of subordinating 
national legitimate interests to judicial review in all matters related to the internal market. Yet, 
the CJEU has stressed that public policy derogations from the Treaty’s fundamental freedoms 
have to be interpreted strictly so as to be applicable only when the case at hand entails a ‘genuine 
                                            
23 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1970] ECR 01125. 
24 L.F.M. Besselink, ‘General Report’, The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon: The Interaction between 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
National Constitutions’. 
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and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’.26 The CJEU also added that 
the scope of public policy shall not be determined unilaterally by the Member States but shall 
rather be subject to scrutiny by the EU Institutions.27  
 
All in all, the CJEU has recognised that the EU legal system constitutes a ‘patchwork of 
different national regulatory styles’28 where national authorities are suitable to weigh up the 
balance between individual and community interests. As such, Member States should be allowed 
a margin of discretion to nourish the dynamic concept of constitutional identity. This is 
especially since ‘the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another.’29 However 
abstract this may be, it constitutes an indication that the compatibility of constitutionally 
entrenched values with EU law has to be ascertained by the CJEU on a case-by-case basis. 
Second, although the CJEU is not bound by the principle of subsidiarity it has to take into 
account the constitutional values that it encompasses, of which constitutional identity is one. 
Third, in doing so, the CJEU has further established that Member States do not – in the name of 
constitutional identity – enjoy absolute discretion to avoid their EU law obligations in order to 
safeguard their legitimate interests. In other words if the situation is covered by the material 
scope of EU law, Member States ought to exercise their competences in accordance with EU 
law.30 There is nothing new under the sun. 
 
The CJEU’s jurisprudential discord on the Treaty’s fundamental freedoms not only suggests that 
EU membership encompasses an adaptation of national constitutions to the requirements of the 
EU legal order but also mandates a disposal of national legitimate interests to an CJEU 
assessment in all cases where there is an identifiable link to the internal market (and occasionally 
not). Henceforth, evidence from the CJEU’s early case law demonstrates that the positive 
obligation undertaken by the EU to respect the identities of its Member States under Article 4 (2) 
TEU is not sufficient on its own for determining the outcome of cases before the CJEU in favour 
of the Member States. It rather has to be balanced against certain variables, such as the 
uniqueness of the right in question and the potential political implications arising out of the 
collision between EU law and national law. Indeed such variables have minimised national 
capacity for autonomous action. Although aggravating at first, ultimately, such limitations serve, 
according to a commentator, ‘the wider purpose of preserving the European Union’s 
constitutional identity on which its success is arguably based.’31 It is argued that such a collective 
constitutional identity is unlikely to be projected to the near future, given that Member States 
differ in the extent to which they are willing to embed their policies within the EU. To be 
continued. 
 
                                            
26 Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, para 86. 
27 Ibid. 
28 A. Héritier, ‘The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy-Making and Its Outcomes: Regulatory Policy 
as a Patchwork' (1996) 3 (2) Journal of European Public Policy 149. 
29 Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, para 87. 
30 See Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-
10837; Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-192/05, Tas Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-
10451; Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann [2009] OJ C 113, 1.5.2010. 
31 D. Thym, ‘The Political Character of Supranational Differentiation’ (2006) 31 (6) European Law Review 781, p. 
795. 
